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Abstract .The field of digital preservation is being defined by a set 
of standards developed top-down, starting with an abstract reference 
model (OAIS) and gradually adding more specific detail. Systems 
claiming conformance to these standards are entering production use. 
Work is underway to certify that systems conform to requirements 
derived from OAIS. 
The fundamental goal of these systems is to ensure that the 
information they contain remains accessible for the long term. We 
develop a parallel set of requirements based on observations of how 
existing systems handle this task, and on an analysis of the threats to 
achieving that goal. On this basis we suggest disclosures that systems 
should provide as to how they satisfy their goals.  
 
Dynamic Preservation  
 
The storage of digital data will require a dynamic form of 
preservation, and a new definition of "archival" may have to be 
developed. The concept of long-term storage of a paper- or 
photographic-based item that remains unchanged over time may not be 
applicable with electronic publishing. Instead, the information will have 
to be re-recorded on new media to be used with existing file formats 
and computer operating systems as storage media degrade and systems, 
formats, and encoding systems evolve.  
There are programs that convert from one encoding system to 
another. Over time, these programs will become more reliable and 
allow data to be reformatted to the current standard approach. But the 
conversion will have to take place in order to keep the information in a 
"current" format. Usually there is a two-year transition between one 
form of storage and its successor. This is both a management and a 
technical issue and tracks the organizational issues—the permanence 
and commitment of the archiving organization—cited in the previous 
section. 
 
1. Open Archival Information System 
 
The field of digital preservation systems has been defined by the 
Open Archival Information System (OAIS) standard ISO 14721:2003, 
which provides a high-level reference model. This model has been very 
useful. It identifies the participants, describes their roles and 
responsibilities, and classifies the types of information they exchange. 
However, because it is only a high-level reference model, almost any 
system capable of storing and retrieving data can make a plausible case 
that it satisfies the OAIS conformance requirements.  
Several digital preservation systems are in, or are about to enter, 
production use preserving content society deems important. It seems an 
opportune moment to complement the OAIS top-down effort to 
generate requirements for such systems with a bottom-up approach. 
 
2. Goal 
The goal of a digital preservation system is that the information 
it contains remains accessible to users over a long period of time.  
The key problem in the design of such systems is that the period 
of time is very long, much longer than the lifetime of individual storage 
media, hardware and software components, and the formats in which 
the information is encoded. If the period were shorter, it would be 
simple to satisfy the requirement by storing the information on suitably 
long-lived media embedded in a system of similarly long-lived 
hardware and software.  
No media, hardware or software exists in whose longevity 
designers can place such confidence. They must therefore anticipate 
failures and obsolescence, designing systems with three key properties: 
 
 
• At minimum, the system must have no single point of failure; it 
must tolerate the failure of any individual component. In 
general, systems should be designed to tolerate more than one 
simultaneous failure.  
• Media, software and hardware must flow through the system 
over time as they fail or become obsolete, and are replaced. The 
system must support diversity among its components to avoid 
monoculture vulnerabilities, to allow for incremental 
replacement, and to avoid vendor lock-in. 
• Most data items in an archive are accessed infrequently. A 
system that detected errors and failures only upon user access 
would be vulnerable to an accumulation of latent errors]. The 
system must provide for regular audits at intervals frequent 
enough to keep the probability of failure at acceptable levels. 
 
3. Threats  
 
To assist in the development of these threat models, we present 
the following taxonomy of threats. Threat models should either include 
or explicitly exclude at least these threats:  
 
• Media Failure. All storage media must be expected to degrade 
with time, causing irrecoverable bit errors, and to be subject to 
sudden catastrophic irrecoverable loss of bulk data such as disk 
crashes or loss of off-line media  
• Hardware Failure. All hardware components must be expected 
to suffer transient recoverable failures, such as power loss, and 
catastrophic irrecoverable failures, such as burnt-out power 
supplies.  
• Software Failure. All software components must be expected to 
suffer from bugs that pose a risk to the stored data.  
• Communication Errors. Systems cannot assume that the 
network transfers they use to ingest or disseminate content will 
either succeed or fail within a specified time period, or will 
actually deliver the content unaltered. A recent study "suggests 
that between one (data) packet in every 16 million packets and 
one packet in 10 billion packets will have an undetected 
checksum error  
• Failure of Network Services. Systems must anticipate that the 
external network services they use, including resolvers such as 
those for domain names] and persistent URLs , will suffer both 
transient and irrecoverable failures both of the network services 
and of individual entries in them. As examples, domain names 
will vanish or be reassigned if the registrant fails to pay the 
registrar, and a persistent URL will fail to resolve if the resolver 
service fails to preserve its data with as much care as the digital 
preservation service.  
• Media & Hardware Obsolescence. All media and hardware 
components will eventually fail. Before that, they may become 
obsolete in the sense of no longer being capable of 
communicating with other system components or being replaced 
when they do fail. This problem is particularly acute for 
removable media, which have a long history of remaining 
theoretically readable if only a suitable reader could be found. 
• Software Obsolescence. Similarly, software components will 
become obsolete. This will often be manifested as format 
obsolescence when, although the bits in which some data was 
encoded remain accessible, the information can no longer be 
decoded from the storage format into a legible form.  
• Operator Error. Operator actions must be expected to include 
both recoverable and irrecoverable errors. This applies not 
merely to the digital preservation application itself, but also to 
the operating system on which it is running, the other 
applications sharing the same environment, the hardware 
underlying them, and the network through which they 
communicate.  
• Natural Disaster. Natural disasters, such as flood, fire and 
earthquake must be anticipated. Other types of threats, such as 
media, hardware and infrastructure failures, will typically 
manifest then.  
• External Attack. Paper libraries and archives are subject to 
malicious attack; there is no reason to expect their digital 
equivalents to be exempt. Worse, all systems connected to 
public networks are vulnerable to viruses and worms. Digital 
preservation systems must either defend against the inevitable 
attacks, or be completely isolated from external networks.  
• Internal Attack. Much abuse of computer systems involves 
insiders, those who have or used to have authorized access to 
the system. Even if a digital preservation system is completely 
isolated from external networks, it must anticipate insider abuse.  
• Economic Failure. Information in digital form is much more 
vulnerable to interruptions in the money supply than 
information on paper. There are ongoing costs for power, 
cooling, bandwidth, system administration, domain registration, 
and so on. Budgets for digital preservation must be expected to 
vary up and down, possibly even to zero, over time.  
• Organizational Failure. The system view of digital preservation 
must include not merely the technology but the organization in 
which it is embedded. These organizations may die out, perhaps 
through bankruptcy, or their missions may change. This may 
deprive the digital preservation technology of the support it 
needs to survive. System planning must envisage the possibility 
of the asset represented by the preserved content being 
transferred to a successor organization, or otherwise being 
properly disposed of. For each of these types of failure, it is 
necessary to trade off the cost of defense against the level of 
system degradation under the threat that is regarded as 
acceptable for that cost.  
 
The degradation may be evaluated in terms of the following questions:  
 
• What fraction of the system's content is irrecoverably lost? 
• What fraction of the user population suffers what delay in 
accessing the impaired but recoverable fraction of the system's 
content? 
Designers should be aware that these threats are likely to be highly 
correlated. For example, operators stressed by responding to one threat, 
such as hardware failure or natural disaster, are far more likely to make 
mistakes than they are when things are calm .Equally, software failures 
are likely to be triggered by hardware failures, which present the 
software with conditions its designers failed to anticipate and under 
which it has never been tested. Mean Time between Failure estimates 
are typically based on the assumption that failures occur independently 







We now survey the strategies that system designers can employ 




The most basic strategy exploits the fundamental attribute that 
distinguishes digital from analog information, the possibility of copying 
it without loss of information, to store multiple replicas of the 
information to be preserved. Clearly, a single replica subject to the 
threats above has a low probability of long-term survival, so replication 
is a necessary attribute of a digital preservation system but it is far from 
sufficient, as anyone who has had trouble restoring a file from a backup 





The creation and management of replicas that lies at the base of 
a digital preservation system involve processes of migration: between 
instances of the same type of storage medium, from one medium to 
another, and from one format to another. Migrations can be exceptional 
events, handled by the system operators perhaps on a batch basis, or 
routine events, handled automatically by the system without operator 
intervention.  
Migration between instances of the same medium, for example 
network transfers from mass storage at one site to mass storage at 
another, is typically used to implement replication and to refresh media. 
All systems employing replication appear to use it. It can be effective 
against media and hardware failures.  
The classic example of migration between media is tape backup, 
used by many systems. It can be effective against media, hardware and 





Digital preservation technology shares some attributes with 
encryption technology. Perhaps the most important is that in both cases 
the customer has no way to be sure that the system will continue to 
perform its assigned task of preserving or preventing access to the 
system's content, (as the case may be). An encryption system may be 
broken or misused and therefore reveal content. However long you 
watch a digital preservation system, you can never be sure it will 
continue to provide access in the future.  
In both cases transparency is key to the customer's confidence in 
the system. Just as open source, open protocols and open interfaces 
provide the basis for the public review that allows customers to have 
confidence in encryption systems such as AES, similar reviews based 
on similar introspection are needed if customers are to have confidence 
that their digital preservation systems will succeed. Examples of open-
source digital preservation systems include the LOCKSS system and 
MIT's DSpace system  
An essential precaution against the software of a digital 
preservation system becoming obsolete is that it be preserved with at 
least as much care as the information that it is preserving. Open source 
makes this easy. Open protocols and open interfaces are a necessary but 
not sufficient precondition for diverse implementations of system 
components.  
 
Despite the best efforts of system designers and implementers, 
and despite the certifications expected to be available for digital 
preservation systems, data will be lost. To improve the performance of 
systems over time, it is essential that lessons be learned from incidents 
that risk or cause data loss. We can expect that such incidents will be 
infrequent, making it important to extract the maximum benefit from 
each. Past incidents suggest that an institution's reaction to data loss is 
typically to cover it up, preventing the lessons being learned. This paper 
shows this problem, in that we have no way to cite or discuss the details 





Systems lacking diversity, in the extreme monocultures, are 
vulnerable to catastrophic failure. Ideally, a digital preservation system 
should provide diversity at all levels, but most systems provide it at 
only a few, citing cost considerations:  
• Most systems use off-line media to provide diversity in media 
for storing replicas, and to isolate some replicas as far as 
possible from network-borne threats.  
• Many systems use geographic dispersion of on-line replicas to 
counter threats of natural disaster (e.g. DAITSS and the BL's 
system). Most systems using off-line backups store them off-
site, again providing geographic diversity. The LOCKSS system 
has replicas scattered around the world.  
• The BL's system is an example of explicit planning for diversity 
in hardware and vendors to support a process of "rolling 
procurement" and "rolling replacement". The library's 
continuous collection program means that the system must grow 
incrementally, its availability requirements mean that replicas 
must be replaced incrementally (a sound approach to preventing 
correlated administration errors ,and its long planned lifetime 
means that vendor lock-in is unacceptable.  
• Similar considerations apply to software. There should be a 
diversity of software among the replicas. The BL's system 
anticipates that at any one time different replicas will be running 
earlier or later versions of their management software, and that 
the different manufacturers of the underlying storage 
technologies will provide some level of software diversity.  
• The BL and LOCKSS systems are examples of diversity of 
system administration. Each replica is independently 
administered; there is no single password whose compromise 
could affect all replicas. Given the prevalence of human error 
and insider abuse of computer systems, unified system 
administration should be an unacceptable feature of digital 
preservation.  
• The Portico and LOCKSS systems are striving for diversity of 
funding. As regards the peers actually storing content, the 
LOCKSS system is already diverse; each peer is owned and 
supported by its host library so no single budget cut or 
administrative decision can cause the system as a whole to lose 
content. Portico as a whole and the team that supports the 
LOCKSS system are both in the process of transition from sole-
source grant funding, to support by the libraries using the 
service. In this model no single budget decision would affect 
more than a few percent of the team's total income.  
• The risk of inadequate diversity is particularly acute for 
networked computer systems such as digital preservation 
systems. Techniques have been available for some years by 
which an attacker can compromise in a very short period of time 
almost all systems that share a single vulnerability]. Worms 
such as Slammer have used them in the wild. System designers 
would be unwise to believe that they can construct, configure, 
upgrade, and expand systems for the long term that would not 




Techniques for reducing the cost of systems are always 
valuable, but they are especially valuable for digital preservation 
systems. Few if any institutions have an adequate budget for digital 
preservation; they must practice some form of economic triage. They 
will preserve less content than they should, or take greater risks with it, 
to meet the budget constraints. Reduced costs of acquiring and 
operating the system flow directly into some combination of more 
content being preserved or lower risk to the preserved content.  
 
We discuss cost reduction at each of the stages of digital 
preservation, ingesting the content, preserving it, and disseminating it 
to the eventual readers. At each stage we identify a set of cost 
components, not all of which are applicable to all systems. 
 
4.6 Economy in Preservation 
 
The cost of preserving the content and its associated metadata has three 
components: the cost of acquiring and continually replacing the 
necessary hardware and software; operational costs such as power, 
cooling, bandwidth, staff time and the audits needed to assure funders 
that they are getting their money's worth; and the cost of the necessary 
format migrations. Systems with few replicas have to be very careful 
with each of them, using very reliable enterprise-grade storage 
hardware and expensive off-line backup procedures. 
 
 
• Storage  
• The economics of high-volume manufacturing means that 
consumer-grade disk drives are vastly cheaper and only a little 
less reliable than enterprise-grade drives. Based on Seagate's 
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) specifications, a 200GB 
consumer Barracuda drive has a 7% probability of failing in a 5-
year service life where a 146GB enterprise Cheetah has a 3% 
probability of failing .Consider, however, that the Cheetah costs 
about $8.20/GB whereas the Barracuda costs only about 
$0.57/GB (Prices from TigerDirect.com 6/13/05).  
• In addition to the severe failures predicted by the MTTF 
specifications, drives specify a rate of unrecoverable bit errors, 
10-14 for the Barracuda and 10-15 for the Cheetah. This is a 
very low probability, but the disks contain over 1012 bits. 
About one in every 62 attempts to read every bit from a 
Barracuda will encounter an unrecoverable bit error; the 
corresponding figure for the Cheetah is about 1 in 860. The 
disks also transfer data very fast. Even if the drive averages 
99% idle, over a 5-year service life the Barracuda will suffer 
about 8 and the Cheetah about 6 unrecoverable bit errors. The 
relationships between these specified error rates and those 
experienced in practice are currently being studied. Several 
large disk farms report more disk failures than would be 
predicted from the specified MTTF numbers. Although an 
experiment with short-lived data encountered fewer 
unrecoverable bit errors than predicted], a preliminary analysis 
of data from the Internet Archive suggests that long-lived data is 
more at risk.  
• Because the in-service failure probability even for expensive 
drives is so high, enterprise storage systems use replication 
techniques such as RAID. These "internal" replicas are costly 
but of little value in digital preservation .They provide high 
availability, but spending heavily to improve availability is hard 
to justify for systems such as dark archives where the 
probability of a user access during the recovery time from a disk 
failure is low. They improve the reliability of the data, but not 
enough to justify their cost. The replicas are tightly coupled to 
each other and are thus subject to many correlated failure modes 
. 
• Another reason why digital preservation systems might not want 
to use enterprise-grade hardware is the cost of power and 
cooling, which can be substantial over the long lifetime of the 
system. Enterprise hardware has to meet exacting performance 
targets and typically does so by using power extravagantly. 
Preservation systems have much lower performance targets and 
can save power both by using consumer-grade hardware and by 
under-clocking it. The Internet Archive has led the way in 
engineering low-power storage systems in this way, spinning off 
a company called Capricorn Technologies to build them.  
• Operation  
• As with any activity involving humans, system administration is 
expensive and error-prone. Yet digital preservation requires 
very low rates of system administration error over very long 
periods of time. The obvious technique is to assign each replica 
to its own administrative domain, so that a single administrative 
error can affect at most one replica. In a peer-to-peer system, 
such as LOCKSS, this is naturally the case; other distributed 
architectures may require more costly measures to achieve 
separate administrative control of each replica.  
• Attempts are sometimes made to reduce the visible cost of 
system administration by running the digital preservation 
system as one of a large number of services offered by a large 
shared server, or as one of a large number of services sharing a 
storage infrastructure such as the Storage Resource Broker. This 
is often a false economy. Layering systems in this way adds 
significant complexity and introduces many failure modes, 
including hardware, software, and network, operational and 
administrative failures, which are absent or much less 
significant in dedicated systems. These add greatly to the risks 
to the stored content. In particular, it is impossible to prevent 
errors in other systems, which share the infrastructure but are 
unrelated to digital preservation, damaging preserved content. 
Machine and administrative boundaries can be very effective at 
preventing faults propagating.  
• The only approach to reducing operational costs while 
maintaining low rates of operator error is to eliminate, as far as 
possible, the system's need for operator intervention. The large 
number of replicas envisaged for the LOCKSS system forced it 
to adopt this "network appliance" approach, which has been 
successful in making the per-replica cost of administration 
affordable.  
• Format Migration  
• Format migration involves both engineering costs, in 
implementing the necessary format converters, and operational 
costs, in applying them to the preserved content. The 
engineering costs will be equivalent whatever approach is taken, 
but the operational costs will vary. The operational cost of batch 
migration may be large and will be incurred at unpredictable 
intervals, making it difficult to budget. This raises the specter of 
economic triage, discarding material whose migration cost 
exceeds its perceived value. The operational costs of the 





Digital preservation is almost unique among computer 
applications in that speed is neither a goal nor even an advantage. There 
is normally no hurry to ingest content, and no large group of readers 
impatient for it to be disseminated. As described above, the lack of a 
need for speed can be leveraged to reduce the cost of hardware, power 
and cooling. It can also reduce the cost of system administration by 
increasing the window during which administrator response is required. 
Tasks that can be scheduled flexibly and well in advance are much 
cheaper than those requiring instant action. But the most important 
reason for sloth is that a system that operates fast will tend to fail fast, 
especially under attack. Slow failure, with plenty of warning during the 
gradual failure, is an important attribute of digital preservation systems, 
as it allows time for recovery policies to be implemented before failure 




Digital preservation systems have a simple goal, that the 
information they contain remains accessible to users over a long period 
of time. In addressing this goal they are subject to a wide range of 
threats, not all of which are relevant to all systems. We have also shown 
a wide range of strategies, each of which is used by at least one current 
system. But the various systems use various techniques to implement 
each strategy.  
The failure of a digital preservation system will become evident in 
finite time, but its success will forever remain unproven. Given this, 
and the diversity of threats and strategies, it seems premature to be 
imposing requirements in terms of particular technical approaches. 
Rather, systems should be required to disclose their solutions to the 
various threats, and other aspects of the strategies they are pursuing. 
This will allow certification against a checklist of required disclosures, 
and allow customers to make informed decisions as to how their digital 
assets may most economically reach an adequate level of preservation 
against the threats they consider relevant.  
 




1. Systems should have an explicit threat model, disclosing against 
which of the threats of they are attempting to preserve content, 
and how they are addressing each threat.  
2. Systems should disclose how their replicas are created and 
administered, and how any damage is detected and repaired. 
3. Systems should disclose the policies and mechanisms they 
implement to protect intellectual property. Specifically:  
• If a system is intended to hold only material when the 
copyright belongs to the host institution, it should 
disclose how it assures that this is in fact the case.  
• If a system is intended to hold material whose copyright 
belongs to others, it should disclose information about 
the agreement under which it is held, such as whether 
and under what terms the agreement can be revoked by 
the copyright holder, and how the permission granted is 
verified, recorded as metadata and preserved.  
• If a system is intended to hold material not covered by 
copyright, such as US government documents within the 
US, it should disclose how it assures that this is verified, 
recorded as metadata and preserved.  
4. Systems should disclose their external interfaces, in particular 
their SIP and DIP specifications. They should disclose whether, 
to assist external auditing, they are capable of disgorging a DIP 
identical to the SIP that caused the content in question to be 
stored, including not just the content but also all the metadata 
originally provided (and none of the metadata that it 
subsequently acquired).  
5. Systems should disclose their source code access policy, and 
how their source code is to be preserved.  
6. Systems should disclose who will conduct audits, how they will 
be conducted, and to whom the results will be provided.  
7. Systems should disclose their policy for handling incidents of 
data loss. To whom are such incidents reported and in what 
form? 
 
The work underway to add certification requirements to OAIS is 
proceeding along similar lines, but from a top-down perspective. We 
note that, while there are strong relationships between the criteria in the 
current draft of these requirements and our suggested disclosures, there 
are very few exact correspondences.  
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